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USE YOUR WORDS:
ON THE “SPEECH” IN “FREEDOM OF SPEECH”
Leslie Kendrick*
Freedom of speech occupies a special place in American society. But what
counts as “speech” is a contentious issue. In countless cases, courts struggle to
distinguish highly protected speech from easily regulated economic activity.
Skeptics view this struggle as evidence that speech is, in fact, not distinguisha-
ble from other forms of activity.
This Article refutes that view. It argues that speech is indeed distinct from
other forms of activity, and that even accounts that deny this distinction actu-
ally admit it. It then argues that the features that make speech distinctive as a
phenomenon also make it distinctive as a normative matter. This does not
mean that the skeptics are all wrong. It does, however, mean that they are
wrong that freedom of speech is conceptually impossible. Speech is special in a
way that makes it a plausible basis for a right of freedom of speech.
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Introduction
“Freedom of speech” is clearly important in American society. But what
is it? Is free speech implicated when a bakery denies service to a same-sex
couple shopping for a wedding cake?1 Is it implicated when a town applies a
zoning ordinance to a tattoo parlor?2 Is it implicated when internet service
providers would rather not follow net neutrality rules?3 The fact that many
litigants, and sometimes courts, think these cases involve the freedom of
speech4 is a sign that the law requires a better definition of what, exactly, free
speech is.
Most people presented with the question would say that free speech has
something to do with activities that we colloquially call speaking, and that
these activities are important in some way. But when serving a cake is
speech, and tattooing is speech, and providing internet access is speech, we
might wonder whether we have strayed rather far both from the notion of
“speech” as a phenomenon and from whatever it is that might make “free-
dom of speech” important as a legal, political, or moral right.
This matters. From a moral or political standpoint, if freedom of speech
is a basic human right, we ought to be able to articulate when it is impli-
cated and when it is not. And if every activity implicates it, we ought to
suspect that something has gone wrong.
1. See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276, 293 (Colo. App.
2015) (upholding state civil rights law against First Amendment challenge by bakery), cert.
granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290
(2017); see also, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013) (same
for photographer); In re Gifford v. McCarthy, 137 A.D.3d 30, 41–42 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)
(same for wedding venue); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 556 (Wash. 2017)
(same for challenge by florist).
2. See, e.g., Buehrle v. City of Key West, 813 F.3d 973, 979 (11th Cir. 2015) (invalidating
ordinance prohibiting tattoo parlors in historic district on First Amendment grounds); Ander-
son v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061–68 (9th Cir. 2010) (invalidating total
prohibition on tattoo parlors on First Amendment grounds); Coleman v. City of Mesa, 284
P.3d 863, 873 (Ariz. 2012) (applying First Amendment intermediate scrutiny to the denial of
use permit to tattoo parlor).
3. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 740 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (upholding net neu-
trality rules against First Amendment challenge by ISPs); Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 634
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (acknowledging but not deciding Verizon’s claim to immunity from net neu-
trality rules under the First Amendment).
4. See e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (conflict mineral
disclosures); Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (meat labels);
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 164–69 (2d Cir. 2012) (prescription drug marketing);
Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (milk labels); Vivid Entm’t,
LLC v. Fielding, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (condoms for adult entertainers);
Martin v. Google Inc., No. CGC-14-539972, 2014 WL 6478416 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2014)
(search engine results).
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From a legal standpoint, the First Amendment’s function is to block the
operation of otherwise valid laws. Invalidating civil rights laws, zoning ordi-
nances, and net neutrality rules on free speech grounds is, in a word, un-
democratic.5 Courts enforcing the First Amendment should do so based on
more than some vague sense that the activity in question is “speech” and
that “speech” is in some vague way important.
But the problem seems to be growing. Litigants who can in any way
characterize their activity as “speech” seek the protection of the First
Amendment.6 In an information economy, the number of litigants who can
plausibly make such claims is on the rise.7 The further this expansion goes,
the more the First Amendment resembles a general right to be free from
regulation, akin to the economic due process and related claims successfully
leveraged by businesses in the Lochner era.8 With the variety of activities now
denoted “speech,” we find ourselves back inside the bakery of Lochner v.
New York, only this time we are arguing over whether the baker has a First
Amendment right to be immune from labor9 and civil rights laws.10 If speech
is different from other forms of activity, then that difference would be useful
in distinguishing what is a free speech claim from what is not.
For a long time, skeptics have challenged our society’s reflexive commit-
ment to free speech.11 The skeptics point out that our treatment of free
5. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics 16–23 (1962); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A
Theory of Judicial Review 4–8 (1980).
6. For literature about the expanding First Amendment, see, for example, Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodation Law, 66 Stan. L.
Rev. 1205 (2014); Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1199 (2015); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77
Law & Contemp. Probs. 195 (2014); Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in
Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era 175 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R.
Stone eds., 2003); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 133.
7. See cases cited supra notes 3–4.
8. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For literature relating contemporary
speech clause jurisprudence to the Lochner era, see, for example, Bagenstos, supra note 6; J.M.
Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990
Duke L.J. 375; Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic
Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1979); Kendrick, supra note 6; Purdy,
supra note 6; Schauer, supra note 6; Shanor, supra note 6; Cass Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87
Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987); Howard M. Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner: Some Thoughts on
First Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N. Ky. L. Rev. 421 (2006).
9. Compare Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 959 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (busi-
nesses have a First Amendment right not to post notice of labor laws), with UAW-Labor Emp’t
& Training Corp. v. Chao, 325 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (businesses do not have a First
Amendment right not to post notice of labor laws).
10. See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 283 (Colo. App. 2015) (con-
sidering whether bakery has a First Amendment speech right to refuse to make wedding cakes
for a gay couple), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights
Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017); see also Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53,
59–60 (N.M. 2013) (same for photographer); Gifford v. McCarthy, 137 A.D.3d 30, 41 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2016) (same for wedding venue).
11. See infra Part II.
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speech—as a matter of both constitutional law and moral- or political-rights
discourse—suggests that free speech deserves to be singled out from other
activities for special discussion. The skeptics challenge this view by arguing
that speech is not different from other activities in any conceptually impor-
tant way.12 Because speech is not different from other activities, it should not
be treated differently from them. As a normative matter, there should not
really be “free speech” rights. What we mistakenly call a free speech right is
either part of some larger right or nothing but the operation of the back-
ground principles that ought to apply to all regulation of all activity. These
challenges by skeptics—and the increasingly far-fetched definitions of
“speech” employed by litigants—put pressure on those who assume speech
is special and different.
As deeply held as the American commitment to free speech is, it is often
equally underdeveloped. If one really wants to answer the skeptics—and to
address the expansion of the First Amendment to tattoo parlors and baker-
ies—one must start again from the very beginning and ask: Is speech differ-
ent from other activities?
This Article does just that. It argues that speech is, in fact, different from
other activities, in ways that would support its being singled out for identifi-
cation as a special right. In saying this, this Article takes on a particular
strand of arguments by the skeptics—that speech, as a phenomenon, is not
distinguishable from other forms of activity. Skeptics make other arguments
as well, and not all of them can be addressed here. But this Article explains
the structure of their arguments and takes the necessary step of addressing
the threshold claim—that speech cannot be distinguished from other
activities.
Part I describes the problem of defining “freedom of speech” by refer-
ence to the case law of the last century. Part II looks at how commentators
have tried to define and justify the freedom of speech during the same time
period. It describes the basic understandings of free speech on offer, includ-
ing the skeptical view. Part III explains that the quandary of whether free-
dom of speech counts as a special right actually involves more than one
question about more than one kind of specialness.
12. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Is There a Right of Freedom of Expression? (2005)
[hereinafter Alexander, Is There a Right]; Larry Alexander, The Misconceived Search for the
Meaning of “Speech” in Freedom of Speech, 5 Open J. Phil. 39 (2015); R.H. Coase, The Eco-
nomics of the First Amendment: The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 Am. Econ.
Rev. 384, 389 (1974); Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & Econ.
1, 9 (1964); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech on Tuesdays, 34 Law & Phil. 119 (2015) [hereinaf-
ter Schauer, Free Speech on Tuesdays]; Frederick Schauer, On the Distinction Between Speech
and Action, 65 Emory L. J. 427 (2015) [hereinafter Schauer, Speech and Action]; Frederick
Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1284 (1983) [hereinafter Schauer, Must
Speech Be Special?]; Lawrence Alexander & Paul Horton, The Impossibility of a Free Speech
Principle, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1319, 1321 (1983) (reviewing Frederick Schauer, Free Speech:
A Philosophical Enquiry (1982)). For a skeptical view of most, but not all, free speech
theories, see, for example, Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry
(1982) [hereinafter Schauer, Free Speech]; Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1 (1971); Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 8.
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Part IV begins the project of defining freedom of speech by addressing
the specialness of speech as a phenomenon. One argument made by the
skeptics of free speech is that speech, as a phenomenon in the world, is no
different from other activities. This is only one objection skeptics make, but
if correct it is a fatal one. I argue that speech as a phenomenon is, indeed,
sufficiently special. Part V argues that the distinctiveness of speech as a phe-
nomenon offers a way to push back against claims that freedom of speech
also lacks distinctiveness on a normative level. In brief, the very reasons that
speech is distinctive as a phenomenon make it highly likely to support the
recognition of a special right of freedom of speech.
Finally, I gesture toward the remaining work that must be done to de-
velop a complete account of free speech as a special right. The end result of
this piece will not be an all-purpose tool that can tell us whether civil rights
laws, zoning ordinances, or net neutrality rules implicate free speech: quan-
daries that have taken decades to develop will require more than one article
to resolve. The end result will instead be a necessary step toward that
resolution.
I. The Expanding First Amendment
The U.S. Constitution refers to “the freedom of speech” as though it
were a freestanding right, distinguishable both from other rights and from
the usual democratic processes of lawmaking.13 Meanwhile, “freedom of
speech” is often treated as a basic human right that exists regardless of the
political system under which individuals live.14 Discussions of freedom of
speech as a legal, political, or moral right thus take for granted that free
speech is meaningfully distinguishable from other rights and from the prin-
ciples that govern the regulation of conduct generally. This status can be
described by saying that free speech is generally considered to be a special
right.15
At the same time, free speech theories almost always refer to some value
that speech furthers.16 No one claims that speech is normatively important
13. U.S. Const. amend. I.
14. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19 (Dec.
10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”).
15. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Religion Without God 131 (2013) (“Freedom of
speech is a special right: government may not infringe that special freedom unless it has what
American lawyers have come to call a ‘compelling’ justification.”). Fred Schauer has asserted
that a free speech right must be “special” in order to be worth singling out. See Schauer, Must
Speech Be Special?, supra note 12, at 1284; see also Bork, supra note 12, at 23 (“The first amend-
ment indicates that there is something special about speech.”).
16. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 1, 2 (1989). The exceptions to this generalization are theories holding that speech gets
special protection not because it is special in and of itself, but because governments are partic-
ularly bad at regulating it. See infra note 63. Such theories, however, may also smuggle in
premises about how speech is more useful or important than other activities. See infra note 96.
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in itself.17 The explanations for why speech deserves special treatment always
lead to the invocation of some larger value. For example, one might argue
that free speech is necessary to the discovery of truth18 or to legitimate dem-
ocratic governance.19 One might argue that free speech is both facilitative
and reflective of human beings’ personal or moral autonomy.20 These justifi-
cations—the search for truth, democratic self-governance, and autonomy—
are the major ones offered in defense of freedom of speech. For these and
any other plausible justifications, some value beyond speech itself is the rea-
son that speech is important.
The quandary, then, is to explain why, if free speech can only be impor-
tant in relation to some larger value, it is worth singling out and discussing
on its own. In this Part, I will sketch the major attempts to address this
question within American case law.
The modern First Amendment was born in separate opinions of Justices
Holmes and Brandeis in 1919 and 1927. Then and ever since, there has been
an impulse to explain the existence of the freedom of speech by reference to
multiple and overlapping justifications: speech is special and different be-
cause it serves multiple functions at once, in a way that is implied to be
exceptional, indeed unique. In this regard, the dominant approach has been
pluralistic.
A signal example is Holmes’s famous 1919 dissent in Abrams v. United
States, which argued for First Amendment protection for distribution of a
Socialist leaflet criticizing the draft. Holmes discussed the marketplace of
ideas. He was skeptical about truth seeking and the power of government to
dictate the right answer to anything:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate
is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an exper-
iment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon
17. See Schauer, supra note 16, at 2.
18. See, e.g., John Milton, Areopagitica 58 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1918) (1644) (“Let
her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open
encounter?”).
19. See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Gov-
ernment (1948); Bork, supra note 12, at 23; Ronald Dworkin, A New Map of Censorship, 35
Index on Censorship, no. 1, 2006, at 130.
20. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech 5 (1989);
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law (2014)
[hereinafter Shiffrin, Speech Matters]; C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Free-
dom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964, 966 (1978); T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and
Categories of Expression, 40 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 519, 532 (1979) [hereinafter Scanlon, Categories of
Expression]; Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 204, 209
(1972) [hereinafter Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression]; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A
Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 Const. Comment. 283 (2011).
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some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is
part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against at-
tempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be
fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interfer-
ence with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate
check is required to save the country.21
This passage was the first attempt to offer a justification for freedom of
speech within the Supreme Court’s corpus, and it remains one of the most
influential.
A second was Brandeis’s 1927 concurrence in Whitney v. California,
which took a similarly pluralist tack.22 In Robert Bork’s estimation, Bran-
deis’s concurrence identified four important functions for free speech: the
development of the faculties, personal satisfaction, a safety valve for society,
and the discovery of political truth.23 Even if one disagrees with Bork’s spe-
cific breakdown, it is undeniable that the arguments in Whitney come fast
and furious, and if they come together in one coherent whole, it has many
moving parts:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State
was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government
the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty
both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of
happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that free-
dom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords or-
dinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine;
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discus-
sion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of
the American government.24
21. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For dis-
sections of Holmes’s dissent and its context, see, for example, Thomas Healy, The Great
Dissent 4, 206 (2013); Edward J. Bloustein, Criminal Attempts and the “Clear and Present
Danger” Theory of the First Amendment, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 1118, 1128 (1989); Gerald Gun-
ther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of
History, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 719 (1975); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First
Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1205, 1271–73 (1983); G. Edward White, Justice
Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 Calif.
L. Rev. 391, 414–19, 435–36 (1992).
22. 274 U.S. 357, 375–78 (1928) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
23. See Bork, supra note 12, at 24–25 (quoting Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)). For other interpretations of Brandeis, see, for example, Haig Bosmajian, Anita
Whitney, Louis Brandeis, and the First Amendment (2010); Philippa Strum, Speaking
Freely: Whitney v. California and American Speech Law 112–20 (2015); Melvin I. Urofsky,
Louis D. Brandeis: A Life 619 (2009); Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of
Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 653
(1988); Rabban, supra note 21, at 1332–42.
24. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
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In Abrams and Whitney, the arguments made in support of free speech
principles were varied and overlapping. For Holmes, they involved demo-
cratic legitimacy, truth seeking, and distrust of government. For Brandeis,
they involved truth seeking, individual development and happiness, and
democratic self-government. In this regard, free speech justifications have
long been pluralistic.
Once free speech protections were recognized, they soon expanded. The
early cases used the pluralistic approach to justify protection of speech that
was explicitly political: Socialist pamphlets, criticism of the draft, and so
forth. But the Court eventually applied these arguments to speech further
afield from political discourse.
One clear example of this expansionist impulse comes from libel law.
The landmark New York Times Co. v. Sullivan decision was distinguished for
its relatively narrow focus.25 It held that the First Amendment protected false
and defamatory statements about public officials in their official duties un-
less the speaker knew the statements were false or was reckless about that
risk.26 The Court likened statements about officials to criticism of the gov-
ernment, which it said the First Amendment had long been understood to
protect.27 In essence, democratic self-governance required the full and free
discussion of public affairs, and liability for negligent or innocent misstate-
ments about public figures chilled that “uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open” debate.28
But this narrow focus quickly gave way to more expansive protection
and more diffuse premises. The Court soon began to ask whether the First
Amendment was not also concerned with protecting all speech about public
figures, or all speech about matters of public concern.29 The Court ulti-
mately concluded that the First Amendment protects speech about matters
of public concern, and that speech about public figures relating to a matter
of public concern gets the same protection articulated in Sullivan for speech
about public officials.30
The arguments that originally applied to speech about public officials
thus extended much further into the realm of public discourse. One First
Amendment commentator, Harry Kalven, foresaw this expansionist impulse
at the time of Sullivan: “[T]he invitation to follow a dialectic progression
from public official to government policy to public policy to matters in the
25. 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
26. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
27. Id. at 273–76.
28. Id. at 270.
29. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29 (1971), abrogated by Gertz, 418 U.S. 323; Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
30. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 362; Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. 29.
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public domain, like art, seems . . . to be overwhelming.”31 Kalven was
correct.
Another crucial example of this expansionist impulse is the Supreme
Court’s reversal on commercial speech during the 1970s. After having long
held that the First Amendment did not protect commercial speech, the
Court executed an about-face and held that it did.32 In drawing this conclu-
sion, the Court emphasized the value of commercial information to con-
sumers and to society as a whole.33 Indeed, the Court noted that consumers
might value, for example, prescription drug pricing information even more
highly than they valued political information.34 The Court seemed to assume
that, because consumers valued commercial information, the First Amend-
ment must value it as well. Justice Rehnquist, for one, was puzzled by this
conclusion:
The Court insists that the rule it lays down is consistent even with the view
that the First Amendment is “primarily an instrument to enlighten public
decisionmaking in a democracy.” I had understood this view to relate to
public decisionmaking as to political, social, and other public issues, rather
than the decision of a particular individual as to whether to purchase one
or another kind of shampoo. It is undoubtedly arguable that many people
in the country regard the choice of shampoo as just as important as who
may be elected to local, state, or national political office, but that does not
automatically bring information about competing shampoos within the
protection of the First Amendment.35
Here, the pluralist impulse leads to expansion: the First Amendment pro-
tects all things that matter to individuals, and that means it protects com-
mercial advertising.
Since the 1970s, the dual impulses of expansionism and pluralism have
continued in First Amendment case law and generated a seemingly limitless
annexation of territory previously thought not to implicate the freedom of
speech.36 It is common for cases to dwell on whether the activity in question
is “speech,” as though this answers the question of whether it receives First
Amendment protection.37 It is also common for courts and litigants to take
31. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment”, 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191, 221.
32. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (holding protected particular ad for
nonprofit providing factual information about abortion services). Compare Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (holding that commercial speech is not within the scope of
the First Amendment), with Va. State Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (holding that it is).
33. Va. State Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 762–65.
34. Id. at 763 (“As to the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial
information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s
most urgent political debate.”).
35. Id. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
36. See, e.g., cases collected supra notes 1–4; literature collected supra notes 6–8.
37. See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Buehrle v. City of
Key West, 813 F.3d 973 (11th Cir. 2015); Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272
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for granted that activities unquestionably involving speech are unquestiona-
bly within the ambit of the First Amendment.38
For example, in a case recently decided by the Supreme Court, busi-
nesses challenged a New York law prohibiting surcharges for using a credit
card. The law states in its entirety:
No seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a holder who
elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar
means.
Any seller who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed $500 or a term of impris-
onment up to one year, or both.39
The litigants claimed that the law violated their First Amendment rights
because it affected how they could describe their prices. They could charge
$103 for credit cards and $100 for cash so long as they described that as a
cash discount, but they could not describe it as a credit card surcharge.40 The
United States in its brief agreed that the law “is a regulation of speech, be-
cause it addresses the manner in which a merchant may present its pricing
scheme to the public.”41 The Supreme Court likewise agreed that the law was
a regulation of “speech” and that therefore the appeals court on remand had
to apply First Amendment scrutiny.42
Yet the fact that a law implicates “speech” does not mean that it impli-
cates “the freedom of speech.” A great deal of speech regulation has always
been treated as completely outside the scope of the First Amendment. Con-
spiracy, perjury, insider trading, antitrust violations, SEC disclosures, con-
tracts, wills, trusts, deeds and conveyances, informed consent, failure to
warn—these are a few areas of law that clearly involve speech and have never
(Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights
Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (upholding state civil rights law against First Amendment
challenge by bakery); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017) (same for
challenge by florist).
38. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (conflict-mineral disclo-
sures); Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (meat labels); Nat’l
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (labor-notice posting), overruled in part
by Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d 18; United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012)
(prescription drug marketing); Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.
1996) (milk labels); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007) (search
engine results); Martin v. Google Inc., No. CGC-14-539972, 2014 WL 6478416 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Nov. 13, 2014) (same).
39. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 518 (McKinney 2017).
40. Brief of Petitioner at 1–2, Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144
(2017) (No. 15-1391).
41. Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 14, Expressions
Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (No. 15-1391). The United States went on to recommend remand
for further factfinding as to whether the law could pass First Amendment scrutiny. Id. at
33–35.
42. Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1150–51.
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been thought to create First Amendment problems.43 The litigants’ argu-
ment in Expressions Hair Design could just as easily apply to, say, the con-
tract doctrine of express warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
Holding businesses liable when they make express warranties on their prod-
ucts also affects how they can describe their wares to the public. And yet this
has never been thought to raise any First Amendment problems at all.
The result of pluralism and expansionism in the case law has been a
runaway First Amendment. Many might find this to be a benign, even a
salutary, development. What is the harm of too much protection? Others
will see an alarming deregulatory parallel to the Lochner era. Perhaps every-
one can agree that an ever-expanding First Amendment forces difficult,
sometimes absurd questions. Should wedding photographers get immunity
from state civil rights laws because what they do is “speech?”44 If they do get
such immunity, do other wedding vendors? Is floral arrangement sufficiently
speechlike?45 Is cake baking?46 Is catering?47 Each of these businesses can
claim that what they do is “expressive.” Is that all that it should take to have
a successful First Amendment claim? If so, then Heart of Atlanta Motel and
Ollie’s Barbecue might have had winning claims too, if only they had
thought to argue that providing lodging or serving food counts as
“speech.”48
First Amendment case law creates such questions, but it provides few
answers. To describe the problem in further detail, and to begin to identify
responses, I now turn to scholarly approaches to freedom of speech.
II. The Specialness Debate
Commentary about the freedom of speech both reflects the forces of
pluralism and expansionism and offers some ways to understand them. The
overview that follows largely will not distinguish between constitutional ar-
guments about what the First Amendment means and normative arguments
about what the freedom of speech requires as a moral or political matter.
This conflation will bother some people, but in the realm of free speech, it is
justifiable.
43. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Explo-
ration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1786 (2004) (listing categories of
speech outside the purview of First Amendment).
44. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
45. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 550 (Wash. 2017).
46. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted
sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017).
47. Cf. Gifford v. McCarthy, 137 A.D.3d 30, 41–42 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (wedding
venue).
48. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding federal
Civil Rights Act against challenge by hotel refusing to serve African Americans on Commerce
Clause, Fifth Amendment, and Thirteenth Amendment grounds); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding federal Civil Rights Act against Commerce Clause challenge by
restaurant refusing to serve African Americans).
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Most of the sources canvassed attempt to interpret the First Amend-
ment, but they do so by reference to normative arguments about why free-
dom of speech might be important.49 They may do this because they believe
the frequent occurrence of freedom of speech in constitutions around the
world suggests that the freedom is first and foremost a human right as a
moral or political matter. They may do this because they think appeal to
normative values is always a permitted part of constitutional interpretation.
They may do this because they think the particular opacity of the phrase
“the freedom of speech” requires it. In one way or another, most of these
thinkers consider whether freedom of speech is justifiably special on a nor-
mative level, even when they are primarily engaged in constitutional
interpretation.50
Nevertheless, the two endeavors are conceptually distinct. They may
come apart when the Supreme Court asserts that speech is special because
the Constitution says it is, or when the Court says it will only recognize
categories of unprotected speech that have historically been unprotected.51
These appear to be exclusively constitutional arguments. Even here, however,
the normative and interpretive are likely ultimately to collapse back together.
It soon becomes clear that “speech” in “the freedom of speech” cannot mean
all “speech”—thus, one cannot simply say that “speech” is important with-
out considering, as Holmes and Brandeis did, what normative values might
make it so.52 As for the Court’s claims about the historical basis for unpro-
tected categories (putting aside the inaccuracy of these claims), the Court’s
jurisprudence on unprotected categories itself involved engagement with the
normative values underpinning freedom of speech.53 In short, as Robert
Bork long ago recognized, it is impossible to interpret the First Amendment
simply by reference to its text or history.54 For this reason, the normative
49. See supra notes 15–16, 19, 31, 43.
50. See supra notes 15–16, 19, 31, 43. Bork is an exception who does not purport to rely
on normative values. Yet Bork’s conclusions about the First Amendment explain why constitu-
tional interpretation and normative deliberation are so entangled in many others’ approaches.
Bork, a committed originalist, determines that, when it comes to the First Amendment, “[w]e
cannot solve our problems simply by reference to the text or to its history.” Bork, supra note
12, at 22. Those sources, he says, are simply too indeterminate to provide any guidance on
what the freedom of speech means. Id. at 21–22. Instead, “[w]e are, then, forced to construct
our own theory of the constitutional protection of speech.” Id. at 22. For him, this means an
appeal to the structure of the Constitution, whose representative processes implied, in Bork’s
view, freedom of political discussion. Id. at 23. But the same indeterminacy Bork finds in the
text and history has encouraged many other thinkers to ask what normative values might
justify freedom of speech, even when they are engaged in constitutional inquiry.
51. See id. at 22 (“We cannot solve our problems simply by reference to the text or to its
history.”).
52. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–78 (1928) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
53. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375–78 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams, 250 U.S.
at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
54. See Bork, supra note 12, at 21–23.
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question is difficult to avoid, and generally neither commentators nor the
Supreme Court has attempted to avoid it. Thus, though matters of constitu-
tional interpretation and those of political morality are distinct as a concep-
tual matter, in practice they overlap a great deal in the realm of free speech.
My treatment of them in what follows will reflect that practice.
The dual forces of pluralism and expansionism are on display in mid-
twentieth century scholarship on the freedom of speech. The major midcen-
tury scholars all reflected these trends in their own ways. Alexander
Meiklejohn was not a pluralist, in that he believed freedom of speech was
rooted solely in democratic self-governance.55 But he was an expansionist, in
that he began with a narrow view of political speech and later greatly ex-
panded his definition of what counted as political.56
In 1963, Thomas Emerson argued that freedom of speech serves multi-
ple purposes, including self-fulfillment, discovery of knowledge, democratic
decisionmaking, and maintaining the proper societal balance between adapt-
ability and stability.57 Relying heavily on a well-intentioned, but questiona-
ble, distinction between expression (fully protected) and action (not),58
Emerson attempted to combine disparate justifications for speech protection
into a unified system.59
Meanwhile, taking a different tack, Harry Kalven wound up in a similar
place. Doubtful that any unified theory could explain the variety of First
Amendment cases, Kalven endorsed a more common law approach to par-
ticular speech-related problems.60 An underlying premise, however, was that
many forms of speech could find protection, often for a variety of reasons.
In their different ways, both Emerson and Kalven considered the justifica-
tions given by their predecessors and selected “all of the above.”
From here, paths of thought diverged. Four trends seem particularly
important. Each takes a different approach to the justifications for free
speech and the expansiveness of free speech protection.
55. See generally Meiklejohn, supra note 19.
56. Compare id. (positing a narrow right to political speech), with Alexander Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245 (positing a much broader right to
political speech).
57. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J.
877, 878–86 (1963); see also Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression
6–7 (1970).
58. See Schauer, Speech and Action, supra note 12, at 436.
59. See generally supra note 57.
60. See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in
America (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988) [hereinafter Kalven, A Worth Tradition]; Harry Kalven,
Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1; Kalven, supra note 31; see
also Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., A Nation Without Heretics, N.Y. Times (Feb. 21, 1988), http:
//www.nytimes.com/1988/02/21/books/a-nation-without-heretics.html?pagewanted=ALl (on
file with the Michigan Law Review) (reviewing Kalven, A Worthy Tradition, supra).
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1. Unified Theories. Some scholars have justified freedom of speech by
reference to one value, such as democratic self-governance,61 autonomy,62
truth seeking, or distrust of government.63 I use these terms loosely, as the
individual theories differ quite a bit in their foundations and conclusions.
Although a unified theory could be broad or narrow—Bork’s democratic
theory is an example of the latter—most are quite expansive. That is not to
say there are no limits. For example, many autonomy theories exempt com-
mercial speech from protection.64 Some democratic theories exempt purely
private speech.65 But most theories are generally expansive.
Unified theories are a scholarly rather than a jurisprudential trend. The
modern trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence has been not to say very
much about the reasons for free speech protection. The Court does periodi-
cally say that political speech is particularly important, but it generally re-
frains from justifying the overall contours of its jurisprudence at all, let
alone by reference to one particular value. This reticence leaves the impres-
sion that the Court is not relying upon a unified theory of freedom of
speech.66
2. Pluralistic Theories. Other theories are explicitly pluralist. Such theo-
ries follow upon and refine the pluralist work of Emerson and others. These
theories posit that speech has an important relationship to multiple values,
including autonomy, democratic self-governance, the search for truth, and
61. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, supra note 19; Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech
and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2004); Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An In-
quiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 299 (1978); Bork, supra note
12; Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue 173 (David
Heyd ed., 1996); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 601
(1990); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech
Doctrine, 97 Va. L. Rev. 491 (2011).
62. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 20; Shiffrin, Speech Matters, supra note 20; C. Edwin
Baker, supra note 20; Scanlon, Categories of Expression, supra note 20, at 532; Scanlon, A The-
ory of Freedom of Expression, supra note 20, at 212–13.
63. See, e.g., Schauer, Free Speech, supra note 12, at 73–86; Daniel A. Farber, Com-
mentary, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 Harv. L.
Rev. 554 (1991). It is worth noting that distrust of government theories like these generally
take the position that speech is not special per se, but only that (1) governments are particu-
larly bad at regulating it or (2) it has some of the characteristics of a public good and therefore
requires subsidization. These theories thus rely on a claim that speech is special, not inher-
ently, but as a quasi-public good and as a particularly vulnerable target for regulation.
64. See Shiffrin, Speech Matters, supra note 20, at 98–102; Baker, supra note 62, at
996.
65. See Post, supra note 61, at 667–72; Weinstein, supra note 61, at 494–97.
66. Nor is this surprising in a multimember court. It is likely not a coincidence that
Holmes and Brandeis said more about the foundations of the First Amendment in separate
opinions than the Court has said since.
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others.67 These theories are pluralistic in their justifications and, unsurpris-
ingly, usually expansive in their scope. Generally, most argue for a strong
degree of protection for a broad scope of speech.
3. The All-Inclusive Approach. A third approach is not really a theory,
nor does it usually endorse a particular justification. It is simply a default
rule: all speech is protected, unless it is shown not to be.68 This approach is
sometimes explicitly adopted within the academy.69 At other times, it ap-
pears to be the implicit basis for scholarly conclusions.
More importantly, this approach, more than any other, seems to be the
driving force behind contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence.70 To be
sure, it is possible that what is really doing the work is a pluralistic account,
or even a very expansive unified theory. But the all-inclusive approach is a
very credible candidate for explaining First Amendment jurisprudence.
When courts say that speech is protected because the First Amendment says
so, they suggest that protection automatically belongs to anything that can
be classified as “speech.”71 This is an approach that attempts to implement
the freedom of speech without reference to any underlying justification.
Similarly, when courts assume that the First Amendment applies to the reg-
ulation of words—even though plenty of regulations of words have never
been thought to raise First Amendment issues—they seem to be implement-
ing an all-inclusive approach.72 In this approach, expansive protection has
become unmoored from any justification. It is an end in itself.
4. The Skeptical View. Finally, various scholars are skeptical of all these
approaches. They vary in their reasons and persuasions, but they unite in
doubting that speech can be meaningfully distinguished from other
activities.
67. See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance
(1990) (taking an eclectic approach to speech protection); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in
First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 521 (embracing the checking function of
the First Amendment but noting it is not the exclusive value); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech
Justifications, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 119 (1989) (endorsing multiple justifications for freedom of
speech); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1212 (1983) (taking an eclectic approach to
speech protection).
68. Barry McDonald dubbed this the “all-inclusive approach.” Barry P. McDonald, Gov-
ernment Regulation or Other “Abridgements” of Scientific Research: The Proper Scope of Judicial
Review Under the First Amendment, 54 Emory L.J. 979, 1009 (2005).
69. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Trouble with “Public Discourse” as a Limitation on Free
Speech Rights, 97 Va. L. Rev. 567, 584 (2011) (defending an all-inclusive approach); Leslie
Kendrick, Note, A Test for Criminally Instructional Speech, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1973, 1977 (2005)
(stipulating an all-inclusive approach).
70. See McDonald, supra note 68, at 1009 (“The Court has generally taken an ‘all-inclu-
sive’ approach to the protection of speech, asserting that all speech receives First Amendment
protection unless it falls with certain narrow categories of expression . . . .”).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First Amendment
itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the
Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judg-
ment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”).
72. See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text.
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In 1971, Robert Bork famously dissected the four rationales for speech
protection that he found in Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence—rationales
that, in Bork’s characterization, bore a striking resemblance to the four ra-
tionales for freedom of speech presented by Thomas Emerson.73 Bork re-
jected self-development, happiness, and a safety-valve function and
identified democratic self-governance as the only plausible justification for
freedom of speech.74 His particular view of protected speech was narrow
enough to deny protection for literature, art, scientific speech, and anything
else not explicitly related to formal policymaking.75
As important as his own view, however, was the skepticism Bork ex-
pressed toward the other theories. In dismissing self-development and hap-
piness as free speech justifications, Bork said that these values
do not distinguish speech from any other human activity. An individual
may develop his faculties . . . from trading on the stock market, following
his profession as a river port pilot, working as a barmaid, engaging in sex-
ual activity, playing tennis, rigging prices or in any of thousands of other
endeavors . . . . These functions or benefits of speech are, therefore, to the
principled judge, indistinguishable from the functions or benefits of all
other human activity.76
Bork believed that self-development and happiness bore the same rela-
tion to speech that they did to other activities. They thus failed as justifica-
tions for treating speech differently from those other activities.
Five years later, after the Supreme Court expanded speech protection to
commercial advertising, Tom Jackson and John Jeffries criticized that devel-
opment. They argued that protection for commercial speech was, in its justi-
fication and effect, indistinguishable from Lochner-era economic due process
such that “economic due process is resurrected, clothed in the ill-fitting garb
of the first amendment.”77
The analogy to economic due process rested upon the view that com-
mercial advertising was indistinguishable from the rest of commercial activ-
ity, which in the post-Lochner era was subject to mere rational basis review.
To be clear, Jackson and Jeffries did not argue that all speech was indistin-
guishable from other activity. They simply argued that no plausible account
of freedom of speech could distinguish commercial speech from other com-
mercial activity.78 To this extent, they sounded a skeptical response to the
continuing expansion of the First Amendment.
Absorbing both the optimistic, expansive pluralism of some scholars
and the Court, and the skepticism of various critics, a young First Amend-
ment scholar in the late 1970s began work on a book that deeply considered
73. Bork, supra note 12, at 24–26; Emerson, supra note 57, at 878–79.
74. Bork, supra note 12, at 24–26.
75. See id. at 20.
76. Id. at 25.
77. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 8, at 30.
78. Id. at 32–33.
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the idea of an independent free speech principle.79 Frederick Schauer’s Free
Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry scrutinized each rationale offered in favor of
freedom of speech.80 It argued that, if each individual argument was uncon-
vincing, then their agglomeration should be no more convincing.81 Giving
close scrutiny to many rationales—such as truth seeking, democratic self-
governance, and autonomy—Schauer concluded that most of them were far
less persuasive than conventional wisdom suggested.82 In a review of that
book, Larry Alexander took an even more skeptical approach, expressing
doubt that any freestanding justification of free speech was possible.83 Ever
since, Schauer and Alexander, in books and articles, have criticized free
speech theory and doctrine for failing to distinguish speech successfully
from other forms of activity.84
Meanwhile, similar arguments have been made by groups as varied as
classical economists, feminists, and critical race theorists. Economists such
as Aaron Director and Ronald Coase viewed the speech market as indistin-
guishable from any other market.85 And if the arguments in favor of a free
market are credited in the marketplace of ideas, they should be equally
credited in the market for goods. Thus, speech is not distinguishable from
other activities, and the proper response is to give all activities the immunity
from regulation that speech enjoys. This argument has been taken up and
developed by libertarians and others interested in heightening judicial re-
view for economic regulation.86
If libertarians want to increase the level of protection for all activity,
feminists, critical race theorists, and others have advocated for a decrease.
Debates about both pornography and hate speech reveal skepticism about
whether speech is different from other forms of activity. Different thinkers
vary in the particulars of their views, but they share an emphasis on an
important similarity between speech and other activities: “speech” can cause
harm just as other “actions” do.87 In their view, the harm-causing properties




83. Alexander & Horton, supra note 12.
84. See sources cited supra note 12.
85. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 12, at 389; Director, supra note 12, at 9; Ideas v. Goods,
Time, Jan. 14, 1974, at 28.
86. See, e.g., Janice Rogers Brown, The Once and Future First Amendment, 2008 Cato
Sup. Ct. Rev. 9; Richard A. Epstein, The Monopolistic Vices of Progressive Constitutionalism,
2005 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 11.
87. For arguments about pornography, see generally Andrea Dworkin, Pornography:
Men Possessing Women (1981); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words (1993); Jennifer
Hornsby & Rae Langton, Free Speech and Illocution, 4 Legal Theory 21 (1998); Rae Langton,
Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 293 (1993); Catharine MacKinnon,
Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1985); Caroline West, The
Free Speech Argument Against Pornography, 33 Canadian J. Phil. 391 (2003). For arguments
about hate speech, see generally Mari J. Matsuda et al., Words that Wound: Critical
Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (1993); Alexander Tsesis,
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of speech are a reason to be critical toward claims about its normative dis-
tinctiveness and its enjoyment of a high level of protection.88
Skeptics have criticized all three of the other dominant approaches—
unified theories, pluralist theories, and the all-inclusive approach. The major
criticism ever since Bork’s article is that these other views fail to articulate
what differentiates speech from other forms of activity.89
The all-inclusive approach falls victim to this criticism because it pur-
ports to treat all speech specially, yet it does not explain how speech is dif-
ferent from other forms of activity. Moreover, because no one is actually an
absolutist about freedom of speech, all-inclusive theories end up excluding
certain forms of speech from protection—such as harassment, blackmail,
insider trading, falsely shouting fire in a crowded theatre, and so forth.90
These carve outs suggest that something else is really driving the all-inclusive
approach.91 Perhaps proponents actually think that some speech is more im-
portant than other speech. Perhaps they are suspicious of government regu-
lation generally. After all, if the claim is that speech is protected unless it is
harmful, then how different is it from other activities, which many people
would say should be regulated only when they cause harm? The all-inclusive
approach, on a skeptical view, is either a front for a different, unarticulated
free speech theory or a symptom of more generalized libertarian sentiment
that happens to have attached to speech.
Pluralist and unified theories face their own skeptical criticisms. Plural-
ist theories are only as plausible as their individual pieces, most of which the
skeptics deem implausible.92 Autonomy theories, in particular, are criticized
for supporting a free speech right on the basis of values that, if taken to their
logical conclusion, would protect a great deal of other activity as well. Bork’s
lines about river-port piloting and price fixing are just one example of this
skepticism that autonomy arguments can successfully justify a special right
of free speech, as opposed to a broader liberty right.93
Destructive Messages: How Hate Speech Paves the Way for Harmful Social Move-
ments (2002); Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (2012); Charles R. Lawrence
III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L.J. 431, 457–76;
Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1596
(2010).
88. See supra note 87.
89. See Bork, supra note 12, at 25.
90. See, e.g., Kendrick, supra note 6, at 1218.
91. See id. at 1218–19 (“The all-inclusive approach cannot avoid the difficult questions:
some activities will have to be defined out, and some set of values will have to govern that
process.”).
92. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 8, at 395 n.44 (“[I]f one thoroughly accepts the agnosti-
cism of . . . democratic pluralism, there is nothing from which the ‘public interest’ could differ.
Conversely, all forms of legislation become special interest legislation.”).
93. Bork, supra note 12, at 25; see Schauer, Free Speech on Tuesdays, supra note 12, at 129
(criticizing Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, Charles Fried, and Seana Shiffrin for failing to distin-
guish speech from other activities: “For both of them [Dworkin and Raz], and for some of
those who understand free speech as an extension of freedom of thought, and for many others,
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Meanwhile, if free speech is only one component of a search for truth or
of democratic self-governance, then there are two possible outcomes. Either
this theory needs an additional basis for distinguishing speech from these
other components, or its advocates need to admit that speech is not so spe-
cial after all.94 Instead of talking about “freedom of speech,” we should be
talking about a right of truth seeking or a right to democratic self-govern-
ance. “Freedom of speech” is merely a subset of one of these rights that has
been arbitrarily singled out for special attention and treatment.
Finally, the skeptics also doubt theories based on distrust of govern-
ment. Arguably this is the minimal basis for treating speech specially: speech
is not necessarily special in and of itself, but the government is particularly
bad at regulating it.95 On the skeptics’ view, such theories (1) rest on ques-
tionable empirical claims about governmental competence and incentives;
(2) are no more likely to be true of speech than of other activities; (3) gener-
ally fail to explain why some speech regulation is suspect and some speech
regulation does not get challenged; and (4) purport to claim that speech is
not special in any other regard but often smuggle in unstated premises about
the specialness of speech.96
The skeptics ask searching questions about our easy acceptance of free-
dom of speech as a special right. According to some, speech should be regu-
lated to the same degree as other activities.97 According to others, different
activities should be protected to the same degree as speech.98 Either way,
treating speech as special makes no sense. As Schauer puts it, “[T]o highlight
a subset of a larger set without a special justification for doing so seems
ordinarily, questions of pure political strategy aside, both misleading and
pointless.”99
what they say about free speech could just as easily and just as accurately be said about free
speech on Tuesdays, or free speech in Cleveland.”).
94. See Schauer, Free Speech on Tuesdays, supra note 12, at 136; see also Alexander &
Horton, supra note 12, at 1324 (noting that democratic self-governance is itself likely founded
on a larger principle, such as “equality of respect for individuals,” which makes it an unlikely
candidate for a freestanding free speech principle).
95. See, e.g., Schauer, Free Speech, supra note 12, at 73–86; Farber, supra note 63, at
560–61.
96. See, e.g., Alexander, Is There a Right, supra note 12, at 145 (2005) (asking why
government should be particularly untrustworthy with speech); Jan Narveson, Freedom of
Speech and Expression: A Libertarian View, in Free Expression: Essays in Law and Philoso-
phy 59, 90 (W.J. Waluchow ed., 1994) (noting that justifications for restricting speech “can
often be met”); Schauer, supra note 43, at 1786 (“ ‘Distrust of government’ theories, for exam-
ple, cannot explain why that distrust has not been extended to the SEC, the FTC, the FDA, the
Justice Department, or judges managing a trial—all of which involve government officials
making content-based decisions about speech, and none of which is now covered by the First
Amendment.”); Alexander & Horton, supra note 12, at 1328–36 (making versions of all four
criticisms).
97. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
99. See Schauer, Free Speech on Tuesdays, supra note 12, at 124.
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The question is of practical as well as conceptual moment. As long as we
have a system that gives most other activity (such as economic activity)
lower constitutional scrutiny than speech, there will be pressure on the
boundary line between the two.100 The skeptics’ view matters because if
speech is not different from other forms of activity, it should not be treated
differently. Then claims of economic due process and general liberty should
be recognized to the extent that the Constitution permits. Or, if one were to
conclude that the First Amendment’s explicit grant of protection to speech
put it on different constitutional footing from other activities, this would be
cause for regret rather than celebration. This question thus has grave consti-
tutional import. Moreover, the expansion of the doctrine over the past forty
years might create the uneasy feeling that the skeptics may be right.
III. The “Special” in Special Rights
Hence the question: Is speech special? To answer this, we have to under-
stand exactly what counts as “special.” I have argued elsewhere that the
question really conceals two questions: How distinctive is speech, and how
robust should its protection be?101 That is, (1) how distinguishable is an ac-
tivity covered by a right from activity outside of it, and (2) how much pro-
tection should it get?102 In essence, distinctiveness is about how wide the
right is, and robustness is about how deep its protection is. These are ques-
tions for any special right, including a right of free speech.
Given where we are in the case law, it is tempting to begin to answer
these questions by jettisoning the category “speech.” We could decide that
we should only talk about “the freedom of speech,” not about “speech.” The
difference is that “speech” refers to a phenomenon in the world, one that
people have a colloquial understanding of. The phrase “the freedom of
speech” is a term of art, one that does not track people’s understanding of
the word “speech.” By large-scale consensus, it excludes some forms of
“speech” (insider trading, etc.), and it includes some nonspeech (music, ab-
stract art, flag burning, etc.).103 The category “speech”—referring to a phe-
nomenon in the world—does not tell us very much about whatever
normative value we are trying to protect when we talk about freedom of
speech.
There is much to be said for this view. As my earlier description of the
case law suggests, courts have become dangerously essentialist—they care a
100. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 8; see also Schauer, supra note 6.
101. Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech as a Special Right, 45 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 87 (2017) [here-
inafter Kendrick, Free Speech as a Special Right]; Leslie Kendrick, How Much Does Speech Mat-
ter?, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 997 (2016) (reviewing Shiffrin, Speech Matters, supra note 20)
[hereinafter Kendrick, How Much Does Speech Matter?].
102. Kendrick, Free Speech as a Special Right, supra note 101; Kendrick, How Much Does
Speech Matter?, supra note 101.
103. See, e.g., Alexander, Is There a Right, supra note 12, at 103–23; Kendrick, supra
note 6, at 1218; Schauer, supra note 43, at 1786.
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great deal about whether a phenomenon counts as “speech,” to the detri-
ment of any consideration of whether it implicates “the freedom of
speech.”104
And yet to ignore “speech” entirely would be a mistake. Consideration
of “speech” is the most promising route by which “freedom of speech” can
be successfully singled out as a special right. Indeed, it may be impossible to
think about the “freedom of speech” as a special right without thinking
about what makes “speech” different and special as a phenomenon.105
Thus, the issue of distinctiveness can be further broken down into two
subparts: How distinctive is speech as a phenomenon, and how distinctive is
it normatively?106 The second question is the most important for free speech
jurisprudence: it is the one that would enable us to defend “freedom of
speech” as a right worth singling out, rather than some indistinguishable
part of some larger value. But the first question—whether speech is distinc-
tive as a phenomenon—is necessary to answering the second.
IV. Speech as a Phenomenon
Is speech special as a phenomenon? If not, this is fatal to the idea of free
speech as a special right. This Part discusses and refutes a view that speech is
not special as a phenomenon.
A. The Skeptical View
Skeptics make arguments against both the phenomenological and the
normative distinctiveness of speech. Any particular skeptic may be making
only one kind of argument. For instance, when Bork says speech is no differ-
ent from river-port piloting, he is not making any claims about their simi-
larity as phenomena in the world. Instead, he is claiming that they are not
normatively distinguishable in their relation to the values of self-develop-
ment and happiness.107 Note, however, that refuting his conclusion would
likely require an argument about speech and river-port piloting. While both
conducive to self-development and happiness, speech and river-port piloting
are differently situated with respect to those values. Such an argument would
require claims that speech does different things from river-port piloting.
These would be claims about speech as a phenomenon. Thus, Bork is actu-
ally making assumptions about speech as a phenomenon: that it is not dis-
tinctive in any way that matters to its normative valence. And refuting this
claim requires arguments for why it is indeed different as a phenomenon.
104. See supra Part I.
105. See Schauer, Speech and Action, supra note 12, at 427–30 (making the same point but
evincing skepticism about whether freedom of speech is ultimately a special right).
106. Kendrick, How Much Does Speech Matter?, supra note 101.
107. Bork, supra note 12, at 25.
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Thus, one fundamental argument is that speech is not different from
other activities as a phenomenon.108 If speech is not different as a phenome-
non, it cannot be different normatively.109 And if it is not different norma-
tively, then it should not be singled out from other activities for special
identification and special protection.
The argument that speech is not distinctive as a phenomenon empha-
sizes that speech acts, and acts speak. First, speech acts in more than one
way: all speech involves activity (uttering, publishing), and much speech al-
ters the world (promising, bequeathing).110 At the same time, acts speak. If
speech is communicative, so are other activities. In fact, everything com-
municates. As Larry Alexander argues, “All speech is symbolic,” and
[c]onversely, any token of conduct can be employed to symbolize an idea, a
word, a syllable, or a letter. Any conduct can constitute a communicative
code. Making marks and uttering sounds are common forms of employing
symbols to communicate. But smoke signals, semaphore flags, facial ex-
pressions, and an almost infinite variety of other conduct can be employed
as communicative symbols. Shooting the mailman may be an effective way
of conveying the thought that one is fed up with the mail service. Covering
oneself with chocolate may be an effective way of spoofing performance
art, and so on.111
Others have voiced similar concerns in attempting to define the bound-
ary between speech and other activity. Cass Sunstein has gestured in a simi-
lar direction in saying that the category “speech” cannot depend solely on
meanings derived by an audience, because an audience can derive meaning
from any activity.112
John Hart Ely similarly rejected efforts to distinguish speech and ac-
tion.113 Justices Black and Douglas, purporting to favor absolute immunity
for all speech, tended to classify some speech as “action” in order to find it
108. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 12, at 39; Alexander & Horton, supra note 12, at 1322,
1331.
109. See, e.g., Alexander & Horton, supra note 12, at 1322.
110. See, e.g., J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (J.O. Urmson & Marina
Sbisa` eds., 1975).
111. Alexander, supra note 12, at 39; see also Alexander & Horton, supra note 12, at 1322
(“ ‘Speech,’ we contend, does not denote any particular set of phenomena. Everything, includ-
ing all human activities, can ‘express’ or ‘communicate,’ and an audience can derive meaning
from all sorts of human and natural events.”).
112. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 555,
556 (1989). Sunstein therefore concludes that the purposes of the speaker, in particular
whether the speaker meant to communicate a message, matters in determining where the free
speech right applies. Id. at 559; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amend-
ment, 1986 Duke L.J. 589, 606. Larry Alexander argues that taking the speaker’s intent into
account makes no sense and cannot avert the problem of distinguishing speech and action.
Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547, 548 (1989).
113. See John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categori-
zation and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1493, 1495 (1975).
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unprotected. For example, Justice Black joined a dissent in Cohen v. Califor-
nia, opining that Cohen’s wearing a jacket with the slogan “Fuck the Draft”
was “mainly conduct and little speech.”114 Meanwhile, Thomas Emerson
sought to identify speech or action as the “predominate element” in a given
activity.115 Emerson concluded that draft-card burning involved more speech
than action and therefore implicated freedom of speech.116 Pouring blood on
draft files, however, was more action than speech.117 Ely ridiculed this ap-
proach as absurd. In response to Emerson, he said, “[B]urning a draft card
to express opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, 100% action
and 100% expression.”118
Ely’s point was directed at “expressive conduct,” such as draft-card
burning or flag burning, but it can be broadened in the way that Alexander
suggests. Certainly, all speech is action on some level, and all action can
communicate. It could be said, then, that all activity is “100% action and
100% expression.”
Thus, one type of skeptical claim is that speech cannot be differentiated
from other actions, because the signal feature of speech turns out to be
something it has in common with all other actions: they all communicate.
Because everything communicates, speech is not different from other activi-
ties, and therefore speech cannot form the basis of a special right.
B. Speech as a Special Phenomenon
The skeptics are right that all activity communicates—or at least that all
activity can communicate. This does not mean that speech is not different.
We prize speech because it communicates differently from, and often better
than, other activities. These differences are sufficient to distinguish speech
from other activities and to consider it as a basis for a normatively distinc-
tive right.
“Speech,” in common parlance, often refers to complex systems of com-
munication—to languages, printed and spoken, and other complex systems
such as sign language and Morse code. These systems communicate more
thoroughly, and often more efficiently and effectively, than other activities.
To many, this will seem an obvious point. Of course a system of communi-
cation communicates better than other forms of activity. But it is precisely
this claim that some skeptics about “speech” downplay.119 They would point
out that plenty of activities communicate. Punching someone in the nose
communicates. Not punching someone in the nose communicates. It is not a
given that speech communicates differently in a way that merits distinction,
so I will spend some time defending that claim.
114. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27–28 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
115. Emerson, supra note 57, at 80.
116. Id. at 84.
117. Id. at 89.
118. Ely, supra note 113, at 1495.
119. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 12, at 39; Alexander & Horton, supra note 12, at 1322.
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Entire academic areas, such as linguistics, speech-language pathology,
and developmental psychology, take for granted that complex systems of
communication are different from other activities and indeed important to
our development and our relationship to the world around us. Entire politi-
cal theories, such as deliberative democracy,120 depend on the premise that
speech accomplishes interchange and fosters understanding, revision, and
consensus in a way that nothing else does.
We need not go so far afield, however, to observe the distinctiveness of
speech. Most parents nowadays, and plenty of nonparents, will be familiar
with the phrase “use your words.” This phrase often comes up when chil-
dren are flagrantly using something other than their words, such as the hit,
the bite, the pinch, or the kick. But we do not tell children to use their words
just because violence is bad or antisocial, or because it begets more violence,
or because it gets them sent home from preschool. Words are not exactly
harmless, and some free speech theories have been criticized for essentially
claiming that they are and stopping there, at the proposition that speech
tends to compare well with other activities in its harm quotient.121
While speech may be an important alternative to violence in some con-
texts, that is not my basis for claiming that speech is special. Nor is it the
only, or even the primary, reason that we tell children to use their words. It
is also because these other actions do not explain very much beyond the raw
fact of negative emotion. Only speech conveys feelings, propositions, and
reasons with nuance, accuracy, and efficiency. Only speech offers the com-
munication, and possible resolution, of internal states. This is not to say that
speech is perfect in these regards.122 But it is far and away the best we’ve got.
Attempting to interpret someone’s thoughts without words is time-con-
suming and often impossible. It is an exercise in frustration for both those
trying to send a message and those trying to receive it. Coming to under-
standing requires physical proximity and intimacy: one cannot do it with
someone who is distant, or even someone who is in the next room. It is
incredibly time-consuming, to the point where it is impossible to observe
more than a few human beings with the required level of attention. And
even when one tries it, success is often limited and never guaranteed.
Parents go through this stage when their children are preverbal, when
they have to guess at the meaning of every positive and negative response.
Do the tags on her shirt bother her? Does the night light comfort him or
120. See generally James S. Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democ-
racy and Public Consultation (2009); Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Why Delib-
erative Democracy? (2004); Ju¨rgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in
The Inclusion of the Other 239 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998); Joshua
Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in Deliberative Democracy 67 (James
Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).
121. See, e.g., Schauer, Free Speech on Tuesdays, supra note 12, at 123–25 (identifying and
criticizing such theories).
122. Nor did we need twentieth-century interpretive theory to alert us to this fact. See,
e.g., William Shakespeare, Twelfth Night act 3, sc. 1 (“To see this age! A sentence is but a
cheveril glove to a good wit. How quickly the wrong side may be turned outward!”).
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keep him up? Without words, parents get only a rough sense of what is
going on, and some things remain mysterious. It is a great relief to everyone
when young children can begin to articulate their thoughts and feelings. We
want children to use their words so that they can identify for themselves
what is bothering them and so that others can understand their point of
view and respond to it. Language is their only bridge from inarticulate un-
happiness to understanding by themselves and others.
But that is just the beginning. We ultimately want children to use their
words on the playground because doing so is a necessary step toward being
able to do everything else we do with speech. It is worth taking a moment to
appreciate all the things that complex systems of communication allow us to
do that we otherwise could not. What follows is only a partial and inexpert
list.123 First, here are some things that we, as potential recipients, would
largely miss out on in the absence of speech:
• the existence and status of people, things, and events outside our imme-
diate field of observation;
• complex or nuanced representations of the thoughts and feelings of
others, both outside and within our immediate field of observation;
• the needs and desires of others;
• the occurrence of events in the past that we did not personally
experience;
• predictions and discussions of potential future events that we do not
ourselves foresee;
• presentations of hypothetical situations that do not occur to us
personally;
• most products of others’ imaginations, such as fiction, improvisation,
and pretend play; and
• the introduction and discussion of abstract ideas, including abstract as-
sessments of any of the above phenomena.
As potential communicators and participants, too, we would miss out
on a great deal, including the ability to
• express our interior states with accuracy and precision;
• express complex or nuanced statements;
• express and seek assistance with needs and desires;
• share memories;
• share products of the imagination;
• share worries, concerns, or uncertainties;
• discuss the future;
• share hypothetical situations, including talking through and seeking ad-
vice on potential courses of action;
123. Seana Shiffrin similarly catalogues the ways in which speech enables people to share
the contents of their minds, a communicative process that she sees as vital to our status as
moral agents. See Shiffrin, Speech Matters, supra note 20. My goal here is more minimalist,
in that I am not advancing a particular free-speech theory at the present. I am simply pointing
out the ways that speech allows us to communicate. Nevertheless, I want to acknowledge Shif-
frin’s prior work and its thoughtfulness in detailing all of the various ways in which communi-
cation through speech enriches us.
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• coordinate with others;
• ask questions of others;
• invite or prompt others’ reactions to our thoughts, beliefs, and feelings;
and
• express abstract ideas, about any of the above and anything else.
The idea of communication advanced here is about information and
interchange. First, it is about information broadly construed. I am not con-
cerned exclusively with facts or propositions, but with the ability to figure
out what others are thinking and feeling, to apprehend concepts and ideas,
and to express thoughts, feelings, and ideas to others. Second, it is about
interchange. As Seana Shiffrin has argued, putting the communicative pro-
cess in terms of inputs and outputs is an oversimplification.124 The sharing
process, the literal “communication,” is larger than the simple acts of send-
ing or receiving.125 Communication enables people to ask and answer ques-
tions, to react, to respond to reactions, to develop ideas together, to
collaborate, to coordinate, and so forth.
Speech is a particularly effective way of communicating, in terms of
both conveying information and creating interchange. It does these things
with far more accuracy, precision, and efficiency than other activities do.
This does not mean that other activities do not have their communicative
virtues. A punch in the nose can convey a message quite powerfully.126 But
left to convey and receive information or to attempt exchange through
means other than speech, individuals would suffer a serious diminishment
of communicative ability.
I have used children as an example. I could mention the experience of
individuals who have experienced strokes and other medical conditions that
interfere with their ability to communicate through speech.127 Recent re-
search has linked deafness to the development of dementia, with one theory
being that reduced ability to engage in exchange leads to diminished mental
capacity.128
But again, we need not rely on such evidence for what is ultimately an
intuitive point. Perhaps the best evidence for it is that anyone who wants to
deny that speech is special has to do so with speech. What alternatives are
there? Without a complex system of communication, debating the special-
ness of speech, or any other activity, would be essentially impossible. There
124. Shiffrin, Speech Matters, supra note 20, at 81.
125. It is for this reason that Seana Shiffrin emphasizes communication and thought,
rather than, say, speaking and listening. Id. Though I take both speakers and listeners to have
speech interests, when it comes to the question of defining what is distinctive about speech,
Shiffrin is right that talking about speakers and listeners misses the importance of the
exchange.
126. See id. at 113.
127. See, e.g., Jean-Dominique Bauby, The Diving Bell and the Butterfly (1997);
William Gibson, The Miracle Worker (1956).
128. Frank R. Lin et al., Hearing Loss and Incident Dementia, 68 Archives Neurology
214 (2011); Richard F. Uhlmann et al., Relationship of Hearing Impairment to Dementia and
Cognitive Dysfunction in Older Adults, 261 JAMA 1916 (1989).
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is simply no other way to convey the idea that a particular activity is or is
not special. There is simply no other way to convey any abstract idea. The
fact that we are having a debate over whether speech is special is proof that it
is.
C. The Structure of the Claim
My claim, then, is about the characteristics of speech as a phenomenon.
The skeptics point out that the only reasonable basis on which to distinguish
speech from other activities is its communicative power.129 To this, they re-
ply that everything communicates, and thus speech is not special. I have just
pointed out all the ways that speech communicates differently from other
activities. It is often the most efficient and effective means of conveying any
proposition, and certain ideas—particularly abstract, hypothetical, or
nonimmediate ones—can only be conveyed using some form of language.
Note that it need not be the case that speech is better at conveying eve-
rything: “A picture paints a thousand words,” or “You say it best when you
say nothing at all.”130 (Both sentiments, one might point out, that one can
only convey in words.) These things can be true, and at the same time cer-
tain speech may not convey very much. Yet it can still be the case that, on
the whole, speech communicates differently from other activities, in a way
that makes it essentially irreplaceable.
This is a claim that takes the structure of a rule or category. It need not
be the case that every occurrence of speech communicates better than every
incident of other activity in order for the two to be distinguishable as phe-
nomena, just as all birds need not fly in order for flight to be a distinguish-
ing characteristic of birds.131
Thus, the claim is not that all speech communicates well, or that only
speech communicates. It is that, on the whole, speech communicates in a
particularly accurate, precise, thorough, and efficient way. There are things
we could do without it. But there is much that we could not do as well, and
there is much that we could not do at all. This is enough of a reason to
distinguish speech as a phenomenon.
Some have asked whether this is a claim about what makes us essentially
human. It is not. For one thing, there are many activities that only humans
can do: cooking, playing tennis, river-port piloting.132 The fact that only
humans can do these things does not necessarily make these things distinc-
tive within the realm of things that humans can do. For another, it is not
evident that only humans use systems of language of the kind that I am
129. See, e.g., Schauer, Speech and Action, supra note 12, at 439–40.
130. See e.g., Keith Whitley, You Say It Best When You Say Nothing at All, on Don’t
Close Your Eyes (RCA Nashville 1988). But don’t see Notting Hill (Universal Pictures
1999).
131. Cf. Frederick Schauer, The Best Laid Plans, 120 Yale L.J. 586, 613–14 (2010) (book
review) (arguing that for law, as for birds, important characteristics need not be universal or
essential characteristics).
132. See Bork, supra note 12, at 25.
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describing. Nothing about my claim turns on whether animals communicate
in similar ways. If they do, then their speech may be distinctive within their
realms of activity just as human language is within ours. (And this activity
could link up to some normative value in relation to these other creatures,
such that depriving them of speech would be a particular type of harm to
them.)
Some have asked the related question of whether this is really about the
kind of speech that only humans can do: speech about abstract ideas, hypo-
thetical situations, future and past experiences.133 Some may endorse this
view, and to the extent that it leads them to conclude that speech is special
as a phenomenon, we will agree on that point. But this is not the thrust of
the argument advanced here. First, most of us are not qualified to opine on
whether humans are the only kinds of animals that can refer to abstract
concepts. Second, even if other animals did, that would not say anything
about the importance of speech within the realm of human activity. Third, it
is indeed striking that there are so many types of ideas that we can really
only communicate through language, but those are not the only communi-
cations that matter or for which speech is particularly effective. Anyone who
has cared for a baby knows that “I’m hungry,” or “My ear hurts,” are won-
derfully efficient sentences that far outstrip other means of communicating
those ideas.
This observation leads to an objection. Even if one accepts that speech is
distinctive enough in its communicative power to be singled out from other
activities, does that not lead right back to the all-inclusive approach? My
argument is not limited to abstract ideas. It also includes interior attitudes
and feelings and many other potentially mundane communications. In say-
ing that “speech,” as a category, is different from other activities, am I saying
that all “speech” deserves the protection of the “freedom of speech”? No.
An argument about phenomenological distinctiveness is not, in itself, a
claim about normative distinctiveness. It still remains to consider why the
communicative power of speech might have normative significance. And de-
pending on the theory one endorses—truth seeking, democratic self-govern-
ance, or autonomy—some instances of speech will have normative
significance and some will not. The next Part discusses this further.134 The
point here, however, is simply that the skeptics cannot claim that normative
significance for speech is an impossibility because speech cannot be distin-
guished from other phenomena in the first place.
A final objection is that I have been discussing languages: complex sys-
tems of communication. Our everyday term “speech” might include more
than that, and certainly “speech” in “the freedom of speech” includes much
133. This line of thinking relates to Aristotle’s claim that “man is a political animal,” as
evidenced by his possession of speech. Aristotle, Politics 1.1253a. I thank Fred Schauer for
the parallel.
134. See infra Section V.C.
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more. It includes nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, dance.135 It
includes flag burning,136 cross burning,137 draft-card burning,138 and so on.
Don’t we want these activities included in the scope of freedom of speech?
Perhaps we do, and perhaps they can be. The decision whether to in-
clude these activities, and more, is a normative one. It depends on what
reason one endorses for thinking “speech” is important enough to merit a
“freedom of speech.”139 Someone who thinks the communicative function of
speech is particularly important in its relation to deliberative democracy will
draw lines differently from someone who thinks the communicative func-
tion of speech is particularly important in its relation to self-expression. The
proponent of deliberative democracy may leave out some speech that the
First Amendment currently protects. The proponent of self-expression may
include all that and more. The proponent of self-expression will have a
problem if it turns out that she thinks all activity equally implicates self-
expression—in that case, the particular communicative properties of speech
are doing no work in her theory, and it is open to the skeptical criticism that
it is just a general liberty principle in disguise. So the details of the norma-
tive theory matter, and they will determine the scope of the freedom of
speech. In this regard, the skeptics may be right that certain theories fail to
distinguish speech from other activities. The point here is that they are
wrong to say that all theories cannot possibly distinguish speech from other
activities.
Thus speech, as a phenomenon, is sufficiently distinctive from other
phenomena to consider whether it might form the basis of a special right.
Skeptical arguments to the contrary engage in a performative contradiction.
They advance the view that speech is not special in the only possible way
that such views can be communicated: through speech.
V. Speech and Normative Distinctiveness
The skeptics argue that (1) speech is not distinctive as a phenomenon,
and (2) speech does not bear a sufficiently distinctive relationship to any
particular normative value.140 I have already argued that speech is distinctive
as a phenomenon.141 I will now argue that its distinctiveness as a phenome-
non makes it highly likely to be distinctive in the relation it bears to the
relevant normative values.
135. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557
(1995) (discussing First Amendment status of various art forms).
136. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (protecting flag burning).
137. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347–48 (2003) (protecting cross burning).
138. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (applying First Amendment
scrutiny on the stipulation that draft-card burning communicated a message).
139. See infra Section V.C.
140. See generally supra Section IV.A.
141. See generally supra Section IV.B.
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A. Normative Distinctiveness
As already noted, free speech theories always refer to some value that
speech furthers.142 Speech communicates more accurately, precisely, com-
pletely, and efficiently than other activities. Because of this, it can facilitate
an overriding value in a particular way: speech makes it possible to commu-
nicate effectively, and this furthers any number of potential larger values.143
This is not likely to be true for all values. If your overriding value is burning
calories, speech is not likely to bear a special relationship to that goal. If your
overriding value is maximizing physical violence, speech may or may not
have something special to offer you.144 Speech does not bear a special rela-
tionship to every potential value. But it is likely to bear a special relationship
to any value that is likely to turn up at the bottom of a free speech theory.
Thus, for example, Robert Bork argues that speech about political mat-
ters is so essential to democratic self-governance that, if the First Amend-
ment did not exist, it would be implied by the structure of the
Constitution.145 Without speech about candidates and policy questions, the
people would have essentially no basis on which to exercise the right to
vote.146 I would go further to point out that a system of democracy is simply
not possible without speech, because without speech it would be impossible
to communicate the ground rules of the system. It is not an accident that
constitutions are composed of words, because without words it would be
impossible to devise a representative system of government. Even systems
without a written constitution rely on words to state what the system of
government is, whether in judicial decisions or in other communications.
Perhaps more autocratic systems of government can exist without speech,
but a system that involves the people will have to communicate with the
people. It will require speech.
Similarly, one might argue that speech is particularly useful in the
search for truth. If each of us were condemned to enjoy only the knowledge
142. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 16, at 3–5.
143. See id. at 5.
144. On the one hand, some people argue that speech is generally less harmful than other
activities. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 57, at 9. On the other hand, some evidence suggests
that speech is a particularly cheap, far-reaching, and persuasive way to inspire violence in
other people. See, e.g., S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Taming Terrorists but Not “Natural Born
Killers”, 27 N. Ky. L. Rev. 81, 86–89 (2000) (collecting examples of violence-inspiring speech);
L. Lin Wood & Corey Fleming Hirokawa, Shot by the Messenger: Rethinking Media Liability for
Violence Induced by Extremely Violent Publications and Broadcasts, 27 N. Ky. L. Rev. 47, 48–49
(2000) (collecting cases); Michael Reynolds, Note, Depictions of the Pig Roast: Restricting Vio-
lent Speech Without Burning the House, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 341, 341–42 (2009) (collecting
instances of violent speech on the internet). I do not intend to take a position on this question
here.
145. Bork, supra note 12, at 23.
146. In Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106
(Austl.), the High Court of Australia held that a right of political communication was implied
by the representative system of government provided by the Australian Constitution. I am
grateful to Fred Schauer for this observation.
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we could amass through personal experience and observation, we would not
get very far.
Autonomy theories are more difficult, and much depends upon the de-
tails. Some of them make a special place for speech more easily than others.
Seana Shiffrin has made the case that speech bears a special relationship to
our status as thinkers because it is the best, and often the only, method for
sharing the contents of our minds with each other.147 On Shiffrin’s view, the
communicative power of speech has an obviously distinctive, indeed singu-
lar, role to play in our status and development as autonomous agents.148
By contrast, Bork criticizes the autonomy-related values of self-develop-
ment and happiness for being equally facilitated by any number of activities.
In Bork’s view, speech does not bear a special relationship to either happi-
ness or self-development.149 Reasonable people could have a conversation
about that proposition, though I will forgo it here. I merely raise self-devel-
opment and happiness as values whose normative relation to speech is more
difficult. Thus, when it comes to autonomy, the particular claims being
made matter a great deal.
My point is that, for all the usual suspects of free speech theory, one can
plausibly claim that the communicative efficacy of speech makes speech nor-
matively distinctive and important. Speech allows people to articulate their
inner thoughts with complexity and nuance, receive information that they
did not gain from personal observation, consider abstract ideas, engage in
discussion, and debate on complex subjects. Speech does these things more
efficiently and thoroughly than other activities. Speech is therefore highly
likely to serve various normative values in a distinctive way. What makes
speech distinctive phenomenologically also makes it distinctive normatively.
B. Significance
We began with the proposition that speech must be distinguishable
from other activities. If it is not, then a free speech right does not exist, and
what we call a free speech right is really something else, such as a general
liberty principle. Our way of talking about free speech suggests that it is a
special right that does not attach to everything, and our jurisprudence sug-
gests the same. We therefore labor under a demand to distinguish speech
from activity generally.
The distinctive communicative power of speech meets this demand. It
provides a sound basis for arguing that speech serves a distinctive role
within various normative frameworks. In particular, this distinctiveness is
sufficient to reply to skeptical objections that speech is just like all other
activities, and that free speech therefore collapses into a general liberty prin-
ciple. The communicative power of speech ensures that it is not the same as
all other activities in the way that it serves a particular value. And if speech
147. See Shiffrin, Speech Matters, supra note 20.
148. Id. at 88.
149. See Bork, supra note 12, at 25.
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serves a particular value differently from other activities, then a free speech
right is not just an indistinguishable subpart of a more general right.
Nor is it a problem that speech contributes to a larger value to which
other activities may also contribute. This objection occurs in two forms.
One form holds that, in order to be significant, free speech must be a free-
standing right, such that it bears a unique relationship to a unique value. On
this account, if free speech contributes to democratic self-governance, then
free speech is not sufficiently distinctive to constitute a right. “Democratic
self-governance” is special, and free speech is just a component of that value.
Indeed, democratic self-governance itself is probably premised on some
deeper value, such as equal dignity and respect, and free speech is not a right
because it is merely an instantiation of this deeper value.150
The other form of the objection holds that, if other activities also con-
tribute to the larger value, then speech is not special, because it is not unique
in contributing to the larger value. For example, if other activities contribute
to democratic self-governance—such as education, economic opportunity,
presumably voting rights—then speech is not special. Or, for another exam-
ple, if other activities also contribute to the search for truth—say, experi-
mentation through the scientific method—then speech is not special in
relation to truth seeking.151
As I have suggested elsewhere, this is asking more than is necessary for
something to constitute a special right.152 It suggests that a free speech right
can only be a right if it is essentially freestanding. But to require a special
right to be freestanding is to doom it to triviality. Any special right worth
talking about is likely to relate to some larger value. It seems perfectly per-
missible for a right to contribute to or instantiate a larger value, if it does so
in a distinctive way. Similarly, it does not detract from the right if other
activities relate to the same value in other ways. Various activities may be
important for democratic self-governance, the search for truth, or auton-
omy, just as different systems of the human body are important for its func-
tioning. We would not say that the cardiovascular system is not worth
identifying as such because it is part of a larger thing called the body, or
because other systems are also necessary for the body’s functioning. The
cardiovascular system serves the body in a particular way. Likewise, one may
claim that the communicative mechanism of speech serves a larger value in a
particular way. To do so is to claim sufficient distinctiveness for speech.
Indeed, I would go further and say that an activity need not be distinc-
tive from all other activities—need not be singular—in order to be the
proper subject of a special right.153 It is enough that the distinctive charac-
teristic of the trait not describe all activity and that every activity with the
150. See Alexander & Horton, supra note 12, at 1324.
151. Bork has been criticized for setting up such a standard. See Martin H. Redish, The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 599 (1982).
152. Kendrick, Free Speech as a Special Right, supra note 101, at 20.
153. See id. at 11–15.
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distinctive characteristic be treated the same way. Under some circum-
stances, it may be sensible to use the term “speech” to denote such a cate-
gory, even if it includes more than just speech and every activity in the
category fosters the activity in the same way.154 This contention does not
matter right now, because the proposition on the table is that the communi-
cative power of speech is essentially singular. But it will matter in a moment,
as we turn to limitations.
C. Limitations
The communicative power of speech is thus sufficient to make it distinc-
tive as a phenomenon and to offer a plausible basis for its normative distinc-
tiveness. This is sufficient to refute certain important claims of the skeptics,
and it is necessary to the propagation of a successful speech theory. But
much work remains. Here are some important remaining questions.
1. The Choice of a Normative Theory
Nothing here tells us anything about what normative value should un-
derlie a free speech theory. The claim applies equally to democratic self-
governance, the search for truth, a carefully constructed autonomy claim,
and much else besides. Someone could endorse insulting other people as a
larger value, and I would argue that the communicative power of speech
puts it in special relation to that goal. Speech has distinctive normative po-
tential, but it also has great normative flexibility. It still remains for theorists
to decide upon a fundamental normative value (or values) and to work out
the details of whether speech does in fact bear a special relation to that
value.
2. The Definition of “Speech” as a Normative Class
It follows that the distinctiveness of speech can tell you very little, on its
own, about what types of speech should ultimately fall under the umbrella
of “the freedom of speech.”155 This depends on the interaction between
speech as a distinctive phenomenon and the particular value claimed for it.
A theorist who endorses democratic self-governance will specify a certain
class of speech as special, because its communicative power bears on that
particular value. A theorist who endorses autonomy will have a different
view, and one who endorses a search for truth will have yet another. Indeed,
154. For a very expansive account that takes this structural approach, see C. Edwin
Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (1989).
155. See supra Section IV.C.
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different theorists with the same overarching value will disagree. This is ap-
parent for political speech in the divergent conclusions of Harry Kalven and
Robert Bork,156 or early Meiklejohn and later Meiklejohn.157
But these disagreements do not undermine the point that these theorists
could all claim that speech is distinctive as a phenomenon, such that the
speech that falls within their preferred normative ambit is sufficiently nor-
matively distinctive from other activities to deserve the label “special right.”
To use an autonomy example, Martin Redish, for instance, has argued that
speech uniquely fosters self-realization, and all speech fosters self-realiza-
tion.158 In his view, speech is normatively distinctive, and all speech has the
quality that makes it so. Seana Shiffrin, by contrast, has argued that speech
uniquely allows people to engage in authentic communication with each
other, but only some speech is authentic and thus protected.159 The point is
not to evaluate these particular theories, but to show that different theories
will draw different lines about what speech is included and what is not.
3. The Inclusion of Nonspeech in the Normative Class of “Speech”
To go further, the distinctiveness of speech is not sufficient to determine
how any given theory should treat nonspeech.160 I have argued that speech is
distinctive in its communicative power.161 I have further argued that this is a
basis on which a theory could assign speech normative distinctiveness.162 But
some theories may hold that communication as a whole is so important to a
particular normative value that all communication should fall within the
normative category of speech. This is a permissible approach, at least hypo-
thetically. It is permissible to conclude that some other activities belong
under the rubric of “free speech” and that “free speech” remains an appro-
priate label for those activities. But the more activities fall under this um-
brella, the more vulnerable the position becomes—and if all activities come
in, then the right described is no longer a special right.163 Thus, the way in
which a particular theory handles this question is a delicate one, and one
that reopens the theory to criticism for not sufficiently distinguishing
speech. The fact remains, however, that once a specific normative value is on
the table, more work has to be done to determine whether any other activity
should be placed under the same umbrella as speech.
156. Compare Kalven, supra note 31, at 193–94, 205–08, with Bork, supra note 12.
Kalven’s approach was not a unified one, but in this particular article he addresses political
speech, and his approach is much more expansive than Bork’s.
157. See supra note 56.
158. Redish, supra note 151, at 594–95.
159. Shiffrin, Speech Matters, supra note 20, at 1–4.
160. See supra Section IV.C.
161. See supra Sections IV.B, IV.C.
162. See supra Section V.A.
163. See supra Part III.
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The results will depend upon the normative theory. A theory could
plausibly maintain the position that speech is sufficiently distinctive in its
communicative power that it stands alone. But a theory could also take a
more expansive view. This is one potential opening for various forms of art
and music. Various forms of what we would colloquially call “action” or
“conduct” may make their appearance here. A theory could hold that com-
munication about a particular matter is so important that, while speech may
be the paradigm case, other activities that communicate about this matter
should fall within the speech right.
For example, one might advance this argument about activity that com-
municates about politics. I do not necessarily recommend this approach. As
Martin Redish has pointed out, plenty of activities communicate about
politics, including terrorism and assassinations, and anyone who takes the
view that all political communication is presumptively protected is going to
have to explain why these activities are not.164 This stance has also generated
arguments about pornography: it turns out to be hard to define when it is
protected political speech and when it is just a recording of people having
sex.165
A related strategy is to open up the definition not of what constitutes
“speech,” but of what types of governmental action are suspect. Thus, one
might sidestep the question of whether any particular activity should fall
under the rubric of free speech and ask instead whether the government is
acting with the purpose of interfering with communication.166 This will
solve some problems, such as the problem of political assassinations and
terrorism, which the state presumably prohibits for reasons unrelated to
communication. It also tells you when the state can prohibit you from burn-
ing something and when it cannot.167
Its success in resolving other problems will depend upon the particular
normative theory for which it is being deployed. As a general principle cov-
ering all communication, justified by human autonomy, it has problems.168
It would suggest that all regulation of any communication—lies, fraud,
falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater—implicates freedom of speech.169
164. Redish, supra note 151, at 599.
165. Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L.J.
589, 591, with Alexander, supra note 112, at 552–54; see also Frederick Schauer, The Aim and
the Target in Free Speech Methodology, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 562, 562 (1989).
166. The discussion of the role of purpose in First Amendment doctrine and theory goes
back at least to cases such as Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941), and United
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), and articles such as Ely, supra note 113. See also
Alexander, Is There a Right, supra note 12.
167. Compare O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377–80 (upholding prohibition on the destruction of
draft cards justified by administrative reasons), with Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410–20
(1989) (striking down prohibition on flag burning justified on grounds of preserving the par-
ticular message of the flag as a symbol).
168. See Robert Amdur, Scanlon on Freedom of Expression, 9 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 287, 289,
298–99 (1980) (criticizing T.M. Scanlon’s autonomy-based claim that all regulation of com-
munication on the basis of its persuasiveness was illegitimate).
169. See id.
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If deployed in the more limited realm of democratic self-governance, its im-
plications will depend on the particular theory. If, for example, one believes
that regulation of campaign spending has the purpose of altering political
discourse, then one should conclude that such regulation falls under the free
speech rubric. And if one also believes that regulation of obscenity, net neu-
trality, fair competition, insider trading, purely private libel, and so forth
does not implicate one’s political principle, then one could think all these
are fine.170 But if one thinks, like Justice Brennan, that pretty much every-
thing is a matter of public concern, then such regulations should look
suspect.171
In any case, speech may be normatively distinctive from other activities,
but a particular normative theory may place such a high premium on com-
munication about a certain subject, or some other feature of the process of
communication, that it sees fit to include some other activities under the
rubric of speech. This is permissible, but it is undoubtedly a point of vulner-
ability. Nevertheless, the persuasiveness of this move is a question about its
particular deployment within a particular normative framework, not a
structural problem about the impossibility of a free speech right. To that
extent, I may disagree with some skeptics in how to describe the problem,
though I may agree with them about the ultimate success of certain theories.
4. The Robustness of Protection for Speech
Finally, recognizing the distinctiveness of speech does not tell us how
stringently it should be protected. This, too, will depend upon the particular
normative theory endorsed. Often, theories of free speech begin with the
proposition that a successful theory must justify immunity for speech, or
speech of a certain kind.172 In fact, little if any speech is completely immune
from regulation.173 Indeed, a theory need not generate immunity, or even
highly robust protection, in order to produce something validly called a free
speech right.174 The important point for now, however, is that providing a
phenomenological and normative basis for singling out speech in the ab-
stract does not dictate a certain level of protection. The particulars of pro-
tection will depend on the normative value claimed for speech.
170. For quite different views that both conclude that content-based regulation in certain
large domains is permissible, see Bork, supra note 12, at 27–28, and Robert Post, Recuperating
First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1249, 1256–62 (1995).
171. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 784–89
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language 9 (1989);
Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, supra note 20, at 204; see also Kendrick, Free
Speech as a Special Right, supra note 101, at 95–96 (offering an overview of such claims).
173. See Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, supra note 20, at 207.
174. Kendrick, Free Speech as a Special Right, supra note 101, at 93.
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Conclusion
The fundamental claim of this Article is that speech is sufficiently dis-
tinctive to form the potential basis of a special right of freedom of speech.
Skeptics are incorrect to say that speech cannot be the basis of a special right
because it cannot be distinguished from other phenomena in the world. It
can be sufficiently distinguished. Moreover, the distinguishing characteristic
of speech—its distinctive communicative power—provides a plausible basis
for normative claims in support of a special right of freedom of speech.
Indeed, all the classic theories of freedom of speech emphasize the commu-
nicative properties of speech. This is not a coincidence: it is a sign that those
theories have been making the case for the distinctiveness of speech all
along.
This Article leaves open what normative value best justifies the freedom
of speech. That is the ultimate issue, and only a comprehensive theory can
formulate answers to the questions now facing courts: when an activity im-
plicates freedom of speech and how much protection it should get. Ulti-
mately, then, the work we have just done cannot tell us whether tattoo
parlors, bakeries, and internet service providers should get First Amendment
protection. But it has clarified what is necessary to answer such questions: a
view about what sets “freedom of speech” apart from the protection given to
other activity, including economic activity. Such a view will tell us which
activities implicate freedom of speech and which do not.
I have also recognized the deficiencies in the major responses to free
speech problems by courts and scholars. The all-inclusive approach to
speech protection does not tell us when to include activity and when to
recognize a carve-out. Either unified or pluralistic accounts may offer some
promise, but the skeptics are correct to point out that fuzzy, expansive plu-
ralism of the midcentury variety has not effectively distinguished free speech
from economic activity and thus far has failed to give courts enough direc-
tion in defining the freedom of speech against the backdrop of lower protec-
tion for other forms of activity.
At the same time, however, the skeptics are wrong to conclude that the
freedom of speech is a conceptual impossibility. The fact that everything
communicates is not, in and of itself, enough of a reason to conclude that a
right of free speech cannot exist. There are still good reasons to single speech
out as a phenomenon, and those reasons carry over into good reasons for
singling it out in various normative frameworks. This does not mean that
every single theory of free speech will successfully articulate a line between
speech and other activity. Doing so may be extremely difficult. But it is not
conceptually impossible in the way some skeptics have suggested.
Saying that speech is distinctive is at once extremely important and not
nearly enough. It leaves unanswered the hard questions about speech and
activity—including speech and economic activity—that opened this Article.
It does, however, start to make progress on those questions, and it gives us
an analytical framework for thinking about particular theories and how they
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succeed or fail. This discussion will continue. And it will continue to be
constituted of speech.
